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Anti-Shi’a Mass Mobilization in Indonesia’s Democracy: Godly
Alliance, Militant Groups and the Politics of Exclusion
M. Khusna Amal
State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN) Jember
Iza_jbr@yahoo.com
Abstract
This article examines violence against religious minorities, especially Shi’a
groups in Indonesia’s democracy. However, this article focuses on the case of the
2016 anti-Milad Fatimah (Fatimah Birth Commemoration) mass mobilization
performed by IJABI (the all-Indonesia Assembly of Ahlul Bait Associations) in
Bondowoso, East Java, Indonesia. This article finds that the anti-Milad Fatimah
mass mobilization involved alliances and conspiracy between Godly Muslim
groups with a non-singular agenda. Sunni militant groups from the Nahdlatul
Ulama (NU), FPI (Islamic Defenders Front, Wahabi/Salafi and Hizbut Tahrir
Indonesia (HTI) groups, which merged into FOKUS (Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama’ah
Communication Forum), were the main actors who played an important role in
driving mass mobilization. Unlike previous studies that understood the anti-Shi’a
movement as merely a form of affirming Islamic orthodoxy, this study determines
that there were greater agendas beyond the theological ones. A number of socio-
political agendas contributed to the anti-Milad Fatimah mass mobilization:
excluding Shi’a in order to capture Islamic public space, challenging religious
authority and local power which was dominated by moderate Muslim groups. The
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involvement of radical Islamist groups, such as the activists of the Tarbiyah and
HTI, are a sign that there is a strong political agenda behind mass mobilization.
However, the imagination of applying Islamic Sharia will never fade from the




Studi ini mengkaji kekerasan terhadap minoritas agama khususnya kelompok
Shi’a di Indonesia era demokrasi. Tulisan memilih kasus aksi mobilisasi massa
anti-Milad Fatimah yang dilaksanakan oleh IJABI (Ikatan Jama’ah Ahlul Bait
Indonesia), Bondowoso, Jawa Timur pada 2016. Tulisan ini memeroleh temuan
yang menarik bahwa aksi mobilisasi massa anti-Milad Fatimah, melibatkan
aliansi longgar di antara kelompok-kelompok Godly Muslim dengan agendanya
yang tidak tunggal. Kelompok-kelompok militant Sunni dari kalangan NU, FPI,
Wahabi/Salafi dan HTI, yang menggabungkan diri ke dalam FOKUS (Forum
Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama’ah), merupakan aktor-aktor utama yang
berperan penting dalam memobilisir aksi massa tersebut. Berbeda dari kajian-
kajian yang umumnya memahami gerakan anti-Shi’ah sebagai bentuk peneguhan
ortodoksi Islam atupun homogenisasi Islam Indonesia, studi ini mendapati
temuan yang jauh lebih besar dan kompleks dari sekedar agenda teologis itu.
Mengekslusi Shi’ah dari ruang public Islam dan menantang otoritas keagamaan
dan kekuasaan local yang didominasi oleh kelompok-kelompok Muslim moderat
merupakan sejumlah agenda sosio-politik yang turut mewarnai aksi massa itu.
Keterlibatan kelompok-kelompok Islamisme radikal seperti aktivis Gerakan
Tarbiyah dan Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), menjadi sinyalemen cukup kuat
adanya agenda politis di balik aksi massa. Bagaimanapun, imaginasi dan cita-
cita penerapan syari’at Islam tidak akan pernah pudar dari gerakan keagamaan
kelompok-kelompok Islamis.
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Keywords: Sunni, Shi’a Mass Mobilization, Religious Militants, and
Democratization
Introduction
Since the reformation in 1998, a year that saw the fall of Suharto’s
authoritarian regime and the rise of radical groups that comprehensively bring the
sharia application ideal,1 acts of religious violence have continuously occurred.
The trend tends to increase instead of decreasing from one year to another, as the
reports of various Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) show. SETARA
Institute for Democracy and Peace, for example, reports increasing levels of
violence, with 135 cases in 2007, 265 cases in 2008, 200 cases in 2009, 216 cases
in 2010, 244 cases in 2011 and 264 cases in 2012.2 The latest report presented by
1. Robert W. Hefner, “Religious Resurgence in Contemporary Asia:
Southeast Asian Perspectives on Capitalism, State, and the New Piety,” The
Journal of Asian Studies 69, no. 4 (November 10, 2010): 1031–47; Noorhaidi
Hasan, Islamizing Education: Integrated Islamic School and New Trend Formal
Education Institution in Indonesia (SS. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies, 2009), 1; Sumanto Al-Qurtuby, “Arabs and ‘Indo-Arabs’ in Indonesia:
Historical Dynamics, Social Relations and Contemporary Changes”, International
Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies 13, no. 2 (2017): 45–72.
2. Kees van Dijk and Nico J.G. Kaptein (eds.), Islam, Politics and Change,
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Komnas HAM reports that there were 74 cases in 2014, increasing to 78 cases in
2015, and reaching nearly 100 cases in 2016.3
Among those religious violence, minority groups, particularly Shi’a,
remain the main target.4 Not merely limited to a form of stigmatization, such as
being branded a heretical and deviant group, Shi’a groups also suffer various
forms of violence, such as discrimination, persecution, mistreatment, destruction
of place of worship, and exclusion.5 These various forms of violence are
experienced by Shi’a groups in a number of areas, such as in Batang (Central Java)
in 2000 and 2006, Bondowoso and Bangil (East Java) in 2007, Sampang (Madura,
East Java) in 2011, Jember (East Java) in 2012, and Yogyakarta in 2013.6 Based
Press, 2016), 14; SETARA Institute, Negara Harus Bersikap: Tiga Tahun
Laporan Kondisi Kebebasan Beragama/Berkeyakinan di Indonesia, (Jakarta:
SETARA Institute, 2010).
3. Kompas, 5 January 2017.
4. Chiara Formichi, “From Fluid Identities to Sectarian Labels, a Historical
Investigation of Indonesia’s Shi’i Communities,” Al-Jami’ah: Journal of Islamic
Studies 52, no. 1 (2014): 101-126.
5 SETARA Institute, Negara Harus Bersikap: Tiga Tahun Laporan
Kondisi Kebebasan Beragama/Berkeyakinan di Indonesia (Jakarta: Setara
Institute, 2010); Wahid Institute, Laporan Kebebasan Beragama/Berkeyakinan
dan Toleransi (Jakarta: Wahid Institute, 2010).
6. Fauziah, “Potret Kerukunan Hidup Umat Beragama di Kabupaten
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on these cases, it can be said that the rise of frequent violence against minority
communities in general, and Shi’a in particular, has been part of the national trend
in the post-New Order era.
Most scholars consider that the emergence of violent actions against Shi’a
is closely related to ideological contests, particularly that between the Ahlus
Sunnah wal Jama’ah (abbreviated hereon as Sunni) groups versus non-Sunni
groups like Shi’a. As a representation of mainstream Islam, Sunni Muslims have
an interest in maintaining their religious authority and orthodoxy.7 We must
acknowledge that this ideological contest makes its own contributions to
3 (2011), 647–661; Masdar Hilmy, “The Political Economy of Sunni-Shi’ah
Conflict in Sampang Madura,” Al-Jami’ah: Journal of Islamic Studies 53, no. 1
(2015), 27–57; Formichi, “From Fluid Identities,” 101–126; Makin,
“Homogenizing Indonesian Islam: Percution of the Shi’a Group in Yogyakarta,”
Studia Islamika 24, no. 1 (2017), 1–31; Wahyudi Akmaliah, “Kekerasan dan
Pengusiran Atas Nama Agama Pasca Rejim Orde Baru: Studi Kasus Konflik
Syi’ah Sampang,”Maarif: Arus Pemikiran Islam dan Sosial 10, no. 2 (2015),
221–242.
7. Formichi, “From Fluid Identities,” 101–126; Al Makin, “Homogenizing
Indonesian Islam,” 1–31; Ken Miichi, Minority Shi’a Groups as a Part of Civil
Society in Indonesia, 2016, http://www.mei.edu/content/map/minority-shi-groups-
civil-society-indonesia?print; Syamsul Rijal, “Internal Dynamics within Hadrami
Arabs in Indonesia from Social Hierarchy to Islamic Doctrines,” Journal of
Indonesian Islam 11, no. 1 (2017), 1–28.
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encouraging occurrence of various religiously violent actions performed by
conservative and radical Sunni against the Shi’a minority. In the name of Islam,
they often justify their actions as a manifestation of a holy struggle in establishing
Islamic authentic teaching.8 In a number of the violent tragedies suffered by Shi’a
group, as mentioned above, it is clear that religion contributes greatly to inciting
hatred and suspicion, encouraging misunderstanding and provoking conflict
accompanied by violence.9
However, explaining violent actions against the Shi’a minority merely
through an ideological contest spectrum which culminates in Islamic orthodoxy
will certainly not give a comprehensive understanding. Such an analysis tends to
ignore the socio-political interests of the actors who claim to be defenders of
Islam. The anti-Shi’a groups often involved in violent actions in the name of
Islamic authenticity are not one entity which is homogenous in all aspects,
including their political ideology. The Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI), the
Indonesian Council of Young Intellects and Ulama (MIUMI), the Anti-Shi’a
National Alliance (ANNAS), Wahabi/Salafi, the conservative Nahdlatul Ulama
(NU) and Muhammadiyah may be known as Muslim orthodox agents, but it is
ensured that the forms of religious orthodoxy for which they struggle will never
be identical. Perhaps they mutually imagine Indonesia without Shi’a, but not all of
8. van Dijk and Kaptein (eds.), Islam, Politics and Change, 13.
9. Haryatmoko, Dominasi Penuh Muslihat Akar Kekerasan dan
Diskriminasi (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2010), 82–83.
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them desire Indonesia to be an Islamic state of the kind politically imagined by
Islamic radical groups such as HTI.10
This paper intends to analyze the new trend of violent actions against
religious minorities, particularly Shi’a, which practically involves coalition and
conspiracy between intolerant groups in the Indonesian democratic era. This paper
argues that behind the anti-Shi’a mass mobilization sponsored by those
conservative and radical Sunni groups, there are agendas far higher and more
plural than merely the affirmation of Islam orthodoxy in Indonesia. By examining
the case of the anti-Milad Fatimah mass mobilization in Bondowoso in 2016, it is
found that the collective action involves a kind of loose coalition between the
conservative NU, FPI, Salafism/Wahabism among the followers of the Al-Irsyad,
PKS activists, and HTI. Their joint interest in rejecting Milad Fatimah becomes
the contact point of each actor in establishing a coalition. This paper also finds
that behind the rejection ofMilad Fatimah there are hidden ideological and
10. Endang Turmudi and Riza Sihbudi (eds.), Islam dan Radikalisme di
Indonesia (Jakarta: LIPI, 2005), 120–153; Abdurrahman Wahid (ed.), Ilusi
Negara Islam: Ekspansi Gerakan Islam Transnasional di Indonesia (Jakarta:
Gerakan Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, the Wahid Institute dan Maarif Institute, 2009),
130; Masdar Hilmy, “The Politics of Retaliation: The Backlash of Radical
Islamists to Deradicalization Project in Indonesia,” Al-Jami’ah 51, no. 1 (2013):
129–158.
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political agendas, which include Islamizing public space and fighting for religious
authority and local power resources.
Shi’a in Bondowoso
Bondowoso is a regency in the eastern part of East Java province, with a
relatively large Shi’a community. According to Habib Baqir, the chairman of
IJABI Bondowoso, the number of Shi’a followers in this region is estimated to be
up to 10,000 people. This number excludes people classified as ahlul bait (people
of the prophetic house) lovers, people who follow the religious traditions and
rituals practiced by the sayyid (literally “master”) or habib (beloved) but do not
expressly identify themselves as followers of Shi’a. In the view of NU elites,
when the criterion is Muslims classified as ahlul bait lovers, the number will be
quite considerable, since the majority of NU followers are ahlul bait lovers, who
are considered direct descendants (dzurriyah) of the Prophet Muhammad.11
Historically, the development of Shi’a communities in Bondowoso cannot
be separated from the entry and development of Islam into the archipelago
through early Islamic missionaries from Gujarat, Persia, Arabia, etc.12 In
Bondowoso, the early Islamic missionaries are derived from Hadramaut-Arabs
11. Interviews with Habib Baqir, November 25, 2017; Habib Murtadlo,
November 25, 2017; Syarifah Nawirah and Syarifah Nawiyah, December 5, 2017;
Habib Umar, September 8, 2017; and K.H. abd Qodir Syams, November 18, 2017.
12. Moh Hasim, “Syi’ah: Sejarah Timbul dan Perkembangannya di
Indonesia,” Jurnal Analisa 19, no. 02 (2012): 147–158.
Font: （Default）Times New RomanDiformat[LF]:
areDihapus[LF]:
Font: （Default）Times New RomanDiformat[LF]:
ShiaDihapus[LF]:
bigDihapus[LF]:








Font: （Default）Times New RomanDiformat[LF]:
ShiaDihapus[LF]:
MoslemDihapus[LF]:
Font: （Default）Times New RomanDiformat[LF]:
Font: （Default）Times New RomanDiformat[LF]:
the lovers ofDihapus[LF]:
Font: （Default）Times New RomanDiformat[LF]:
asDihapus[LF]:
Font: （Default）Times New RomanDiformat[LF]:
ShiaDihapus[LF]:
Font: （Default）Times New RomanDiformat[LF]:




Font: （Default）Times New Roman, 12 ptDiformat[LF]:
25Dihapus[LF]:
Font: （Default）Times New Roman, 12 ptDiformat[LF]:
25Dihapus[LF]:
Font: （Default）Times New Roman, 12 ptDiformat[LF]:
5 DesemberDihapus[LF]:
Font: （Default）Times New Roman, 12 ptDiformat[LF]:
Font: （Default）Times New Roman, 12 ptDiformat[LF]:
Dihapus[LF]:
13
who came to some regions in the archipelago in the eighteenth century.13 One of
the Hadramaut Ulamas who began spreading Islam in the Bondowoso area early
on was al-Habib Muhammad bin Ahmad al-Muhdhor (1863–1926 M).14 Along
with the migrations of the Arabs to Bondowoso, a village later known as the
‘Arab village’ was established. This fact supports the view that there were Arab
city fortresses in 1880s in a number of areas in East Java and Central Java,
including Bondowoso.15
The polarization and tension between Sunni and Shi’a started in the 1980s,
when Habib Hamzah bin Ali al-Habsy, a habib known for his religious knowledge,
charisma and position as the teacher of habib and traditionalist Muslims in
Bondowoso, declared himself a Shi’a follower. There is considerable evidence
showing that Habib Hamzah became a Shi’a follower at the time of the Iranian
revolution initiated by Imam Khomeini in 1979. Habib Hamzah’s enchantment
with the heroic story of Imam Khomeini and his encounter with new sources of
knowledge from the intellectual thinking of Iranian Shi’a Muslims (such as Ali
Syariati, SyahidMuthahari, and Allamah Thabathaba’i) encouraged him to
13. Al-Qurtuby, “Arabs and ‘Indo-Arabs’ in Indonesia,” 45–72.
14. Mauladdawilah, Abdul Qodir Umar, 17 Habaib Berpengaruh di
Indonesia (Malang: Bayan & Pustaka Basma, 2010), 87–100.
15. L.W.C.V.D. Berg, Hadramaut dan Koloni Arab di Nusantara (Jakarta:
INIS, 1989), 68–70.
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become a Shi’a follower.16 These facts support the opinion that the Shi’a identity
in Indonesia was established in the New Order era, particularly following the 1979
Iranian revolution.17
The development of Shi’a communities in Bondowoso may also be
observed by the establishment of religious organizations such as IJABI in 2006,
which is directly connected to the central IJABI led by Jalaluddin Rahmat that
was established on July 1, 2000.18 In addition, the Shi’a community in
Bondowoso also saw the foundation and Majlis Ta’lim As-Shadiq established in
1995. The initiator and chairman of both organizations was Habib Hamzah. After
16. Interviews with Habib Umar, September 8, 2017, and Matkur,
November 6, 2017.
17. Martin van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-
Suharto Indonesia,” South East Asia Research10, no. 2 (2002), 117–154;
Azyumardi Azra, “Islamic Thought: Theory, Concept, and Doctrines in the
Context of Southeast Asian Islam”, in K.S. Nathan and Muhammad Hashim
Kamali (eds.), Islam in Southeast Asia: Political, Social and Strategic Challenges
for the 21st Century (Singapore: ISEAS, 2005), 8–9; Masdar Hilmy, “The
Political Economy,” 27–57; Formichi, “From Fluid Identities,” 101–126; Makin,
“Homogenizing Indonesian Islam,” 1–31.
18. Hilman Latief, “The Identity of Shi’a Sympathizers in Contemporary
Indonesia,” Journal of Indonesian Islam 2, no. 2 (2008), 300–355; Formichi,
“From Fluid Identities,” 101–126; Moh Hasim, “Syi’ah: Sejarah Timbul,” 147–
158.
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Habib Hamzah’s death, the leadership of the two Shi’a organizations passed to his
successors, Habib Baqir for IJABI and Habib Abu Thalib bin Habib Hamzah for
As-Shadiq, until now. However, the existence of those religious institutions is not
merely a symbol of the existence of a Shi’a community, but also an effective
instrument for Shi’a development in Bondowoso.19
2016 Rising Anti-Shi’a Mass Mobilization
Alongside the growth of the Shi’a community in Bondowoso, an
escalation of tension with Sunni groups is inevitable. Many complaints are made
by members of the Sunni community concerned about Shi’a growth. In various
occasions like religious preaching, they begin to alarm the Muslims regarding the
heresy and danger of Shi’a teaching. In addition, they spread anti-Shi’a
propaganda to the Muslims in Bondowoso. In this propaganda, they often use
MUI’s fatwa to legitimate the depiction of Shi’a religious teachings and views as
heretical. As is commonly known, MUI is a faction of Islamic orthodoxy that
often issues fatwa regarding the heresy, deviance and danger posed by Shi’a to the
Sunni majority.20
19. Interviews with Syaeful Bahar, November 25, 2017, and Saehan,
October 15, 2017.
20. Mohammad Atho Mudzhar, Fatwa-Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia:
Sebuah Studi Pemikiran Hukum Islam di Indonesia 1975–1988 (Jakarta: INIS,
1993), 114–126; Nur Ichwan, “The Local Politics of Orthodoxy: The Majlis
Ulama Indonesia in the Post-New Order Banten,” Journal of Indonesian Islam 06,
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Anti-Shi’a sentiment found its momentum through a number of events,
such as, first, a case of forced dissolution of the inauguration of IJABI’s regional
administrators, performed by a mob suspected to be derived from the Sunni
community, on June 4 , 2006. Second, an incident where a student of Pesantren
Al-Wafa in Jambesari, identified as a Shi’a follower, was beaten on August 12,
2006. Third, a mass attempt to burn the house of a Shi’a figure in Jambesari, kyai
Mushawir, on September 12, 2006. Fourth, the forced dissolution of IJABI’s haul
and teaching events in Jambesari on December 23–24, 2006. In general, those
violent actions against Shi’a groups may be localized and prevented from igniting
the sentiment of Muslims in Bondowoso.21
Relationally, the increasing anti-Shi’a sentiment in Bondowoso cannot be
separated from the tidal wave of radicalism at various levels, nationally and
globally. In the context of the Indonesian democratic era, the chance of openness
and freedom may actually be utilized by conservative and radical groups to justify
their group’s existence and religious teachings. Although in the minority, they are
known to be vocal and militant in conducting their religious movements. As
no. 1 (2012), 166–194; Dicky Sofjan, “Minoritization & Criminalization of Shi’a
Islam in Indonesia,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 39, no. 2
(2016): 29–44.
21. Imam Syaukani, “Konflik Sunni-Syi’ah di Bondowoso,” Harmoni
Jurnal Multikultural-Multireligius 8, no. 31 (2009): 85–87; Fauziah, “Potret
Kerukunan Hidup,” 647–661; Interview with K.H. abd Qodir Syams, November
18, 2017.
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representatives of Islamic politics, the religious actions they perform often use
violence as both a physical and a symbolic instrument. Their main agenda is the
politicization of religion, whether for political or ideological interests.22
In Bondowoso, the flow of conservatism is derived from conservative and
radical Sunni groups. The FPI, TarbiyahMovement or PKS activists,
Wahabism/Salafism among the followers of Al-Irsyad, HTI, and Islamic groups
classified as Islamic hardliners emerge and become the new actors in violent
movements against religious minorities. Unfortunately, the existence of these new
Islamic groups greatly contributes to religious intolerance, discrimination and
violence against heterodox minority groups, including Shi’a.23 Since the
emergence of these new Islamic variances, anti-Shi’a sectarian voices, hatred, and
propaganda in Bondowoso arise from all directions. In one momentum, the anti-
Shi’a voices crystallized into a collective action involving an anti-Milad Fatimah
mass mobilization on April 4–6, 2016. In fact, theMilad Fatimah is an annual
ritual routinely organized by the Shi’a group and there had been almost no tension
22. Martin van Bruinessen (ed.), Contemporary Developments in
Indonesian Islam: Explaining the Conservative Turn (Singapore: ISEAS, 2013);
Robert W. Hefner, “Global Violence and Indonesian Muslim Politic,” American
Anthropologist 104, no. 3 (2002), 754–765; Masdar Hilmy, Islamism and
Democracy in Indonesia Piety and Pragmatism (Singapore: ISEAS, 2010).
23. Turmudi and Sihbudi (eds.), “Islam dan Radikalisme”; Abdurrahman
Wahid (ed.), “Ilusi Negara Islam”; Ichwan, “The Local Politics of Orthodoxy,”
166–194.
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with any Sunni groups. However, the massive rejection occurred when the IJABI
invited national figures such as Jalaluddin Rakhmat and Haidar Bagir to the Milad
Fatimah.24
Unlike previous cases, the rejection ofMilad Fatimah in 2016 involved a
massive number of people from various Islamic groups (about 3,500 people). This
mass mobilization was also reported by national and local mass media, both
printed and online. There was a potential clash between the anti-Milad Fatimah
groups with the Shi’a minority group, requiring the government to secure it with a
large number of security officers. Since the anti-Shi’a groups could not force the
regency administration to cancel theMilad Fatimah, they then organized a
competing event with a theme of grand preaching and praying together,
centralized at the Mosque At-Taqwa.25
In a series of mass actions, the anti-Milad Fatimah groups addressed
various issues, such as the heresy and danger of Shi’a teaching to the Islamic
Sunni teaching followed by most of Indonesia Muslims, mut’ah marriage, and
insults to the sahabat (friend) of Prophet Muhammad. In addition, the Shi’a
danger issue was also related to the issue of nationality. The banners and posters
they brought to demonstrations read “The existence of Shi’a in Indonesia is a
factor to split the people, a real threat to the unity of the nation or NKRI and
24. Interviews with Matkur, November 6, 2017; Syaeful Bahar, November
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national disintegration.” Therefore, the mob insisted that the government cancel
the permit for theMilad Fatimah. In their opinion, allowing theMilad Fatimah to
continue was equal to legitimating the Shi’a community and their heretic
teachings.26
Although classic, religious sectarian issues are evidently a useful tool to
ignite Muslims’ inter-group emotion and spur involvement in mass action.
Framing the issue this way reminds us of the success of Islam defending action in
Jakarta. Both actions employ religious sentiments to mobilize a mass in order to
achieve their political goals. A crowd of 3,500 people is big enough for a regency-
sized area. The anti-Milad Fatimah mass action is recorded as the biggest Islamic
demonstration in the history of the rejection of Shi’a in Bondowoso. It was also
through this action that an Islamic conservative and radical inter-group alliance
was realized. One thing which could unite them in one religious coalition was
anti-Shi’a sentiment.27
Alliances Among Godly Muslims
The anti-Milad Fatimah collective action did not only involve a large
crowd with various socio-religious backgrounds, but also an alliance among
26. Interviews with Mudassir, November 24, 2017 and K.H. Hasan,
September 30, 2017.
27. Ichwan, “The Local Politics of Orthodoxy,” 166–194; Makin,
“Homogenizing Indonesian Islam,” 1–31.
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groups known as—borrowing Jeremy Menchik’s term—Godly Muslims.28 They
consist of conservative nahdliyin, radical FPI, Al-Irsyad Wahabi/Salafi, PKS
activists, and HTI elements. Unlike the Islam Defending Action 212, for which
FPI was the main spokesman, the action to rejectMilad Fatimah was pioneered
by conservative nahdliyin elites. Among the central figures was K.H. Mohammad
Hasan Abdul Muiz, son of K.H. Abdul Muiz Tirmidzi, the caretaker of the pondok
pesantren (Islamic Boarding School) Sayyid Muhammad Alawi al-Maliki, Koncer,
Bondowoso. During his office as the chairman of MUI Bondowoso, kyai Abdul
Muiz was known as the most vocal figure to defend MUI’s fatwa related to
Shi’a’s heresy. On behalf of MUI’s fatwa, he often supports anti-Shi’a actions and
legitimates them as Aswaja defending action from Shi’a’s desecrating heretic
teaching.29
Following the death of kyai Abdul Muiz al-Tirmidzi, the anti-Shi’a actions
were continued by his son, kyaiMuhammad Hasan Muiz. Like his father, he is
also known a vocal proponent of anti-Shi’a sentiment and propaganda. Moreover,
when the Shi’a people were going to show their existence by organizing Milad
Fatimah and inviting Shi’a national figures, he expressly rejected it. With other
conservative Sunni figures, he established a forum called FOKUS (Sunni Ulama
Communication Forum), which combined the forces of ulama (religious scholars),
28. Jeremy Menchik, “Productive Intolerance: Godly Nationalism in
Indonesia,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 56, no. 3 (2014), 591–621.
29. Interviews with K.H. abd Qodir Syams, November 18, 2017; Syaeful
Bahar, November 25, 2017; and Matkur, November 6, 2017.
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kyai (religious person, mostly from pesantren), and pesantren alumni networks
existing in Bondowoso Regency. The alumni networks that joined FOKUS
included IKSASS (Salafiyyah Syafiiyyah Situbondo Students and Alumni
Association), IAS (Sidogiri Islamic Boarding School Alumni Association),
TANAZZAHA (Zainul Hasan Islamic Boarding School Alumni Association),
IKAPETE (Tebu Ireng Islamic Boarding School Alumni Association), Sarang
Islamic Boarding School Alumni Association (Central Java), Al-Azhar Egypt
Alumni Association, etc. It was also through this forum that they mobilized
students and Muslims to contribute to the anti-Milad Fatimah mass
mobilization.30
Conservative NU youths also take similar initiatives and measures. They
formed their own movement forum, called GERPAS (Anti-Shi’a Youth
Movement). This organization was initiated and pioneered by a young kyai, an
alumnus of pesantren Sidogiri and currently increasingly prominent kyai
Mudassir. In his opinion, the formation of this organization was inspired by the
Muslim national figures’ ijtihad in forming the Anti-Shi’a National Alliance
(ANNAS), which arose in response to the Sampang Sunni-Shi’a conflict case in
30. Interviews with kyaiMudassir, November 24, 2017 and K.H. Hasan,
September 30, 2017.
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2011.31 Through GERPAS, he actively organizes Muslim millennials to join and
get involved in Aswaja defending action to reject Milad Fatimah.32
In practice, both anti-Shi’a mainstream organizations, FOKUS and
GERPAS, are the main driver of anti-Milad Fatimah actions. The proponents of
these movements are aware that any social movement will not find success or
have a strong pressuring power without the support of other groups. In this
context, they acquire more allies by establishing an alliance with the other groups.
Muslim elites from the FPI, conservative Islamic boarding school elites,
Wahabi/Salafi group from Al-Irsyad organization branch, PKS activists, and HTI
are all involved in the alliance. Mass actions on the part of this Islamic inter-group
alliance has successfully forced the administration of Bondowoso regency and
East Java province to respond seriously by sending a large number of security
officers, with about 1,700 personnel.33
However, the establishment of a coalition among those conservative and
radical Sunni groups cannot be separated from their political interests in not only
rejecting the commemoration, but also de-legitimating Shi’a groups. As a general
anti-Shi’a movement, those involved in the anti-Milad Fatimah mass mobilization
31. Dede Syarif, Iskandar Zulkarnain, and Dicky Sofjan, “Anti-Shi’ism in
Indonesia: Geneology, Development, and Methods,” Harmoni: Jurnal
Multikultural & Multireligius 16, no. 1 (2017), 24–37.
32. Interview with Mudassir and FGD, September 25 & October 15, 2017.
33. FGD, October 15, 2017; http://www.timesindonesia.co.id.
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have the relatively uniform perspective that Shi’a is a heretic, deviant religious
teaching and a view that poses a threat to Sunni teaching.34
The conservative and radical groups go to the extreme of labelling Shi’a as
the enemy of Islam, which allows for the use of violent methods against them.
They are of the opinion that removal of the enemy of Islam will maintain the
authenticity of Islamic teaching. According to them, Islam becomes out of order
as the result of Muslim figures’ indecisiveness about how to respond to Islam’s
enemy. Therefore, they expressly criticize any tolerant and accommodative
attitudes of Muslim groups they label as “liberal” who protect the enemy of
Islam.35
Islamizing Public Space
The involvement of Islamic radical groups in mass mobilization indicates
is the presence of a larger political agenda than merely demanding the
cancellation ofMilad Fatimah. FPI, Tarbiyah/PKS activists, HTI, and Al-Irsyad
Wahabi/Salafi are Islamic radical groups whose religious movements are more
politically than religiously oriented. Although they have different approaches and
34. Sofjan, “Minoritization & Criminalization,” 29–44.
35. Interviews with Kyai Mudassir, November 24, 2017; K.H. Hasan,
September 30, 2017; and Supriyadi, December 2, 2017.
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strategies of movement, the three are similar in their approach to the application
of Islamic sharia and the Islamization of both power and public space.36
In practice, radical HTI activists and Wahabi/Salafi choose a revolutionary
approach to encourage socio-political change, while PKS activists tend to choose
a moderate-accommodative approach within a democratic system.37 In short, we
may say that the involvement of those Islamic political agents in the mass
mobilization action is not merely related to the objective-manifest agenda of
rejecting Milad Fatimah or delegitimating Shi’a as a means of affirming
Indonesian Islamic orthodoxy,38 but is far bigger and more political than all of
them and centers on the agenda of Islamizing power. They offer sharia as an
alternative to the national principle and emphasize its advantages over any other
system, including secularism.39
36. Turmudi and Sihbudi (ed.), Islam dan Radikalisme,” 164;
Abdurrahman Wahid (ed.), “Ilusi Negara Islam,” 164; van Bruinessen (ed.),
“Contemporary Developments,” 35–39; M. Imdadun Rahmat, Ideologi Politik
PKS, Dari Masjid Kampus ke Gedung Parlemen (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2008), 114.
37. Hilmy, “Islamism and Democracy,” 117–126; Masdar Hilmy,
“Radikalisme Agama dan Politik Demokrasi di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru”,
Jurnal MIQAT 39, no. 2 (2015), 407–425.
38. Makin, “Homogenizing Indonesian Islam,” 1–31.
39. Lily Zubaidah Rahim, “The Road Less Travelled: Islamic Militancy in
Southeast Asia,” Critical Asian Studies 32, no. 2 (2003): 209–232; Noorhaidi
Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militansi dan Pencarian identitas di Indonesia Pasca
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The indication of a hidden political agenda is expressed by moderate
nahdliyin intellects, activists and figures as—to borrow the conservative group’s
term—liberal. According to them, the fact that HTI joined the anti-Milad Fatimah
mass action cannot be textually read only as a gesture of solidarity in affirming
Islamic orthodoxy. More than that, their involvement cannot be separated from
their mainstream political agenda, which is to replace the power system.40 In this
case, they use the momentum of the anti-Milad Fatimah mass action to show their
identity, existence, and classical, political agenda, the affirmation of the khilafah
(caliphate). In their political doctrine, khilafah is the only solution for Muslims to
gain freedom from the subjugation of unfaithful people and to live as directed by
God.41
HTI activists’ involvement in the anti-Milad Fatimah mass mobilization is
considered by the liberal-moderate nahdliyin group as a form of carelessness on
the part of the conservative nahdliyin group that became the main promoter of the
mobilization. In fact, the mass mobilization can be used well by HTI activists to
Orde Baru (Jakarta: LP3ES dan KITLV, 2008), 17; Greg Fealy, “Bukan Sekedar
Ahok: Menjelaskan Aksi Massa pada 2 Desember”, in Indonesia At Melbourne,
Melbourne University, December 12, 2016.
40. Interview with Syaeful Bahar, November 25, 2017; Mas’ud, October
17, 2017; and FGD, September 25 & October 15, 2017.
41. Greg Fealy, “Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia, The Faltering Revival?”
Southeast Asian Affairs (2004): 104–121; Hilmy, “Islamism and Democracy,”
2010, 117–122.
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show their group identity and political agenda. The flag attributes and various
properties of action written “la ilaaha illallahu muhammadur rasulullah” on
sheets of black fabric are truly put on display in the anti-Milad Fatimah mass
action. As seen by the attributes used, the involvement of HTI in the mass action
is considerably more dominant than the remaining participants. To moderate-
liberal groups’ critics, it appears as if the thousands of nahdliyin masses were only
a Trojan horse for the Islamic political groups, particularly HTI, with their
political agenda to affirm khilafah Islamiyah.42
Similarly, PKS’s involvement in the action is considered an impure or
untrue action to cancel the commemoration organized by the Shi’a group. It is an
open secret that their religious activities are closely related to the Islamization
agenda. Unlike HTI, which rejects democracy, they are relatively accommodating
to the democratic system in realizing their political agenda, one of which is set
through the political party they have established, PKS. In addition to formal
politics, they also use socio-religious avenues such as da’wah activities, including
halaqah, dawrah, pengajian (religious lectures), liqa’ (meetings), rihlah (tours),
mabit (staying overnight), seminars, workshops, and formal educational
institutions, such as establishing various Islamic integrated schools.43 They use
42. Interviews with Mas’ud, October 17, 2017, and Matkur, November 6,
2017.
43. Hasan, “Islamizing Formal Education,” 1–29; Noorhaidi Hasan,
“Islamist Party, Electoral Politics and Da’wah Mobilization among Youth, The
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these two paths as the main means to realize their Islamization agenda. As per
Hasan Banna’s doctrine, the Islamization process starts with the individual,
proceeding to the family, community, and nation, and finally the world.44
The Islamization agenda can also be read from the involvement of other
Islamic radical Wahabi/Salafi figures. Salafi figures from the Al-Irsyad
organization branch and the leader of Al-Ishlah Islamic boarding school are
suspected of mutually supporting power Islamization. In various popular
Islamization actions at the national scale, like the 212 action, they are the main
actors fully involved in the mass mobilization. Ideologically, they have uniform
ideals with most of the 212 action leaders. The Jakarta Sharia Concept, for
example, is also adopted as an alternative to Islamization in Bondowoso. They
have great interest in making Bondowoso an Islamic regency. Therefore, they
participate in any attempts towards realization of regional sharia regulation.45 Any
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia,” Journal of Indonesian Islam 06, no.
01 (2012): 17–47.
44. Bassam Tibi, Islam dan Islamisme (Bandung: Mizan, 2012), 53–55;
Suadi Asy’ari, “Incorporating Islamism into Secular Education System, An
Attempt of Gradual Islamization of the State and Society by an Indonesian
Tarbiyah Movement in Jambi,” Journal of Indonesian Islam 11, no. 1 (2017): 29–
58; Nazih Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World
(London: Routledge, 2004), 123.
45. Interviews with teachers at Al-Ishlah Islamic boarding school,
September 14, 2017, and Faisol Nasr bin Madi, September 8, 2017.
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attempts by anti-Shi’a groups in pushing a regional sharia regulation agenda
indicate that the Indonesian Islamic law formalization movement remains active.46
Challenging Religious Authority and Local Power
Behind the collective agenda to reject theMilad Fatimah, there are other,
more pragmatic interests. A competitive atmosphere of fighting for religious
authority is quite apparent in the mass action. Authority contestation may be
observed in the fighting between minority groups and between minority and
majority groups. Like Shi’a, the conservative and radical Islamic groups are a
minority compared to the moderate Muslim majority. Moreover, among those
involved in the alliance, there are competitions and ideological confrontations.
Fights between conservative nahdliyin groups and Wahabi/Salafi groups, for
example, are a common sight in the practice of religious internal life in
Bondowoso. Each group is involved in contestation to fight for and control
Islamic public space in Bondowoso.47
46. Menchik, “Productive Intolerance,” 591–621.
47. Muhammad Ansor, “Post-Islamism and the Remaking of Islamic
Public Sphere in Post-Reform Indonesia,” Studia Islamika 23, no. 3 (2016): 471–
515; Makin, “Homogenizing Indonesian Islam,” 1–31; FGD, September 25 &
October 15, 2017.
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However, in the Shi’a case, conservative and radical minority groups,
which are mutually derived from Sunni Islam,48 attempt to reduce their
differences and confrontations in cooperating to reject the Milad Fatimah.
However, it is certain that their intention to remove Shi’a is not merely
encouraged by ideological motives and, especially, a similar Sunni theological
doctrine that Shi’a is a heretic religious teaching and view.49 More than that, their
involvement in the action can undoubtedly not be separated from a political
interest in fighting for authority among Muslim minority groups. Shi’a is a
minority which is growing relatively well compared to Sunni minority groups.
They also consider that Shi’a’s growth may seriously threaten Sunni religious
authority.50
In addition, authority contestation also illustrates a conflicting relationship
between the Shi’a minority group and Sunni majority group. Sunni conservative
and radical groups exist non-dominantly in Bondowoso, far below moderate
Muslim figures. In Shi’a’s case, for example, it is moderate Muslim groups’
aspirations which shape the regency administration’s inclusive policy to give
48. Azyumardi Azra, “The Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama’ah in Southeast Asia:
The Literature of Malay-Indonesia ‘Ulama’ and Reforms,” Heritage of Nusantara
International Journal of Religious Literature and Heritage 2, no. 1 (2013), 1–21.
49. Sofjan, “Minoritization & Criminalization,” 29–44; Miichi, “Minority
Shi’a”; Makin, “Homogenizing Indonesian Islam,” 1–31.
50. Interview with Kyai Mudassir, November 24, 2017; K.H. Hasan,
September 30, 2017; and K.H. abd Qodir Syams, November 18, 2017.
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permits for the implementation of Milad Fatimah. This condition is fairly
contradictory to other regions facing the same case, such as Sampang (Madura),
where conservative and radical groups have a dominant influence in the
government’s discriminative policy making.51
The authority contestation between conservative and radical groups versus
moderate groups intersects with both groups’ domination of local religious
institutional control. For example, conservative nahdliyin’s hatred of what they
call “Said Aqiel Siradj’s nahdliyin” may be read as a form of authority and power
contestation in dominating the Nahdlatul Ulama Branch Administrator (Pengurus
Cabang Nahdlatul Ulama, PCNU) Bondowoso organization. The mass action
they promote to reject the Fatimah Birth commemoration clearly indicates their
opposition to the power of PCNU Bondowoso, which is dominated by the
moderate-liberal group. The term “NU garis lurus” (NU straight line) or “NU
kanan” (NU right wing) affixed by moderate nahdliyin groups to the conservative
group, and the term “NU Said Aqiel Siradj” with liberal and pro-Shi’a
connotations directed to the moderate group by the conservative nahdliyin group
51. Khoirul Mustamir, “Agama Menegara: Potret Pembajakan Kekuasaan
Negara dan Masa Depan Syi’ah di Jawa Timur,” Ma’arif 10, no. 2 (2015): 268–
296; A’an Suryana, “Discrepancy in State Practices: The Case of Violence against
Ahmadiyah and Shi’a Minority Communities during the Presidency of Susilo
Bambang Yudoyono,” Al-Jami’ah 5, no. 1 (2017): 71–103.
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is a clear evident of internal competition within nahdliyin in fighting for authority
and Islamic institutions.52
Besides its domination of the NU organization, the moderate-liberal
nahdliyin group also has a strong influence on the regency’s administration
regime and wider access to many semi-governmental religious institutions and
other governmental institutions. MUI, Forum for Religious Harmony (FKUB),
Education Council, and Local Research Council are some of the institutions under
the control of moderate nahdliyin figures. MUI, which is always under
conservative groups’ control, is, in the case of Bondowoso, controlled by the
moderate-liberal group. Therefore, the local MUI does not maximally serve its
function to support the conservative and radical power in influencing the
government’s policy to suspend the event. Instead of conservative behavior, MUI
Bondowoso, particularly during the last two periods, has progressively rejected
any fatwa of the central and provincial MUI of Shi’a heresy.53 Because of this
attitude, MUI Bondowoso is affixed with a heretic and liberal predicate by
Muslim conservative and radical groups.54
Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated that the 2016 anti-Milad Fatimah mass
mobilization in Bondowoso had a strong ideological and socio-political interest.
52. FGD, September 25 & October 15, 2017.
53. http://muijatim.org.
54. Interviews with Kyai Mudassir, November 24, 2017; K.H. Hasan,
September 30, 2017; K.H. abd Qodir Syams, November 18, 2017.
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The anti-Milad Fatimah movement can be seen militant-radical Sunni elites’
effort to undermine religious authority in the Islamic public sphere and local
power resources. The conservative nahdliyin, FPI, Tarbiyah or PKS activists, HTI,
and Wahabi/Salafi wings in Al-Irsyad are the Sunni militant-radical groups which
became the main anti-Milad Fatimah actors allied to exclude Shi’a communities
from public sphere. Through FOKUS and GERPAS, they organized Muslims not
only to cancel theMilad Fatimah event, but also to delegitimize the Shi’a group
in the public sphere in Bondowoso. Their main interest in delegitimizing Shi’a is
not only related to Indonesian Islamic orthodoxy affirmation projects but is also to
ideological and political interests. However, the involvement of HTI, PKS
activists, and Wahabi/Salafi of Al-Irsyad in anti-Milad Fatimah action has shown
that there was a strong ideological-political agenda, such as Islamization.
Meanwhile, the socio-political agenda behind the anti-Milad Fatimah mass
mobilization can be seen in their internal competition, particularly between
Islamic conservative and moderate groups in fighting for local power resources.
This paper also finds that the target of the anti-Milad Fatimah movements is not
only the Shi’a community, but also the government and Islamic moderate groups.
In various cases of Sunni-Shi’a conflict in Bondowoso, the government and
moderate Muslim always show inclusive behavior toward the deviant-labeled
minority. In addition, the moderate Muslim groups have dominant access to
various local power resources. Their closeness to local government gives them
more chances to access various power resources, such as the Local House of
People’s Representatives, Local Research Council, etc. It is in this context that the
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rising anti-Milad Fatimah mass mobilization cannot be separated from
competition in fighting for control of various religious institutions and state power
resources at the local level.
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